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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
James S. Easter, Jr.
1
 and Ennie, Inc. (“Ennie”) appeal 
the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to American 
                                              
1
 James S. Easter, Jr. died during the pendency of these 
proceedings.  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43, Edward R. 
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Automobile Insurance Company (“AAIC”) and denial of their 
motion for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment 
action.  Specifically, AAIC sought and received a declaratory 
judgment that its insured, insurance agent Tyrone Murray, is 
not covered under its professional liability policy.  This case 
presents a threshold issue of whether Easter and Ennie have 
standing to appeal.  We conclude that Ennie has standing to 
appeal as a directly injured party of the insured (Murray), but 
that Easter does not have standing to appeal because his 
interests in this case are too remote and speculative.   
 
On the policy coverage issue, we agree with the 
District Court that Murray was not covered under AAIC‟s 
policy.  Thus, for the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment.  
 
I. 
 
 On March 23, 2006, nineteen-year-old Stephen Meloni 
drove his vehicle while intoxicated and struck a pole, 
tragically killing his passenger, Jessica Easter.  James S. 
Easter, Jr. individually and as the Administrator of the Estate 
of his daughter Jessica, filed a lawsuit on October 25, 2006, 
against Ennie and Steven L. Meloni in the Philadelphia 
County Court of Common Pleas (“Easter lawsuit”).  Easter 
alleged that Ennie illegally sold alcohol to nineteen-year-old 
Gary Grato, who then supplied that alcohol to Meloni causing 
him to operate his vehicle negligently and recklessly.   
 
                                                                                                     
Easter and Jeanette I. Easter have been substituted as parties 
in his place.   
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 In response to the lawsuit, Ennie sought a defense and 
indemnification from its general liability insurer, Century 
Surety Company (“Century”).  Century provided Ennie with a 
defense under a reservation of rights and then filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment to Century, declaring that 
Century did not owe Ennie a defense or indemnification for 
the Easter lawsuit because the insurance policy in effect 
during the relevant time period contained a liquor liability 
exclusion. 
 
 Consequently, on November 27, 2007, Ennie filed a 
lawsuit (“Ennie lawsuit”) against its insurance agent, Tyrone 
Murray, alleging that Murray negligently failed to place 
liquor liability insurance coverage for Ennie.  Through its 
principal Thai Poeng, Ennie claimed that it consulted with 
Murray on August 23, 2000, with the purpose of obtaining 
insurance that would protect the company from any and all 
risks arising out of the business of operating a beer 
distributorship.  Ennie alleged that in 2002, Murray sold it the 
Century insurance policy under the pretense that it protected 
Ennie from these risks.  With this belief, Ennie renewed that 
policy annually through Murray.  Murray attested that Poeng 
renewed the Century policy that was in effect during March 
2006 in December 2005, and that this policy did not contain 
liquor liability coverage.  Hence, Ennie alleged that Murray, 
as a licensed commercial insurance agent, breached his duty 
to advise it properly of the necessity or availability of liquor 
liability coverage.  Ennie contends that due to this breach of 
duty, it was required to pay the costs of its own defense in the 
Easter lawsuit and has been subjected to a potential adverse 
judgment arising out of the lawsuit. 
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In response to the Ennie lawsuit, Murray sought a 
defense under his professional liability policy with AAIC.  
Murray, as an insurance agent with The Agents & Brokers of 
Infinity Property Casualty Corp., enrolled online for his own 
insurance coverage through AAIC, which provided a “claims 
made and reported” errors and omissions liability policy.  The 
first AAIC policy was issued to Murray on January 1, 2006, 
providing coverage from January 1, 2006 through January 1, 
2007.  The policy was properly renewed and Murray 
continued to receive coverage from AAIC for the period of 
January 1, 2007 through January 1, 2008.  Murray‟s AAIC 
policy contains the following relevant language:  
 
NOTICE – THIS IS A “CLAIMS 
MADE AND REPORTED 
POLICY” 
 
THIS MEANS THAT 
COVERAGE APPLIES ONLY 
TO A CLAIM FIRST MADE 
AGAINST THE INSURED AND 
REPORTED DURING THE 
POLICY PERIOD OR, IF 
APPLICABLE, DURING THE 
EXTENDED REPORTING 
PERIOD.  
 
* * * 
 
I. COVERAGE 
 
A.  Insuring Agreements 
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1.  Agents Error and 
Omissions Liability 
 
We will pay 
on the 
Agent‟s 
behalf all 
Loss which 
such Agent is 
legally 
obligated to 
pay as a 
result of a 
Claim first 
made against 
such Agent 
or its 
Agency/Age
ncy Staff and 
reported to 
Us during the 
Policy Period 
in accordance 
with Section 
VI. 
Conditions 
1.2., 
provided that 
such Claim is 
for a 
Wrongful 
Act in the 
9 
 
rendering of 
or failure to 
render 
Professional 
Services in 
connection 
with a 
Covered 
Product if 
that 
Wrongful 
Act occurs 
wholly after 
the 
Retroactive 
Date.  
 
* * * 
 
II. DEFINITIONS 
 
C.  Claim, either in the 
singular or plural, means: 
 
1. Any written 
demand You 
receive for 
compensatory 
damages or 
services for a 
Wrongful Act 
including but not 
limited to the 
10 
 
institution of 
arbitration 
proceedings 
against You, or 
 
2. Any civil 
proceeding 
seeking 
compensatory 
damages against 
You for a 
Wrongful Act 
commenced by 
the service of a 
complaint or 
similar pleading.   
 
All Claims against 
the Insured arising 
out of the same 
Wrongful Act or 
Interrelated 
Wrongful Acts [of 
one or more of the 
Insured] will be 
considered one 
Claim.  All Claims 
arising out of 
Interrelated 
Wrongful Acts will 
be considered first 
made at the time the 
earliest such Claim 
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was made against 
the Insured.  
 
* * * 
   
Q.  Wrongful Act, either in                                                     
the singular or plural, 
means: 
  
1. Any actual or 
alleged negligent 
act, error or 
omission, or 
negligent 
misstatement or 
misleading 
statement by any 
Agent or its 
Agency/Agency 
Staff in the 
rendering of or 
failure to render 
Professional 
Services; or 
 
2. Any actual or 
alleged negligent 
Personal Injury 
arising out of 
any Agent‟s or 
its 
Agency/Agency 
Staff‟s rendering 
12 
 
of or failure to 
render 
Professional 
Services.   
3.  
Appendix (“App.”) 64, 66, 69 (emphases added).   
 
The AAIC policy also contains the following 
amendatory endorsement: 
 
Retroactive Date means 
the earlier of;  
 
1. The 
Retroactive 
Date, if any, 
shown on 
the Agent‟s 
Property/Cas
ualty 
Insurance 
Agent‟s 
Error and 
Omissions 
Liability 
Policy; 
 
a. Which 
immediat
ely 
preceded 
the first 
policy 
13 
 
America
n 
Automob
ile 
Insurance 
Company 
issued to 
the 
Agent; or 
 
b. Which 
immediat
ely 
preceded 
the date 
the Agent 
was first 
added to 
the 
America
n 
Automob
ile 
Insurance 
Company 
Policy, if 
the 
Agent 
was 
added 
after the 
inception 
date of 
14 
 
the first 
America
n 
Automob
ile 
Insurance 
Company 
Policy, 
provided 
that there 
is no 
lapse in 
coverage 
between 
the 
terminati
on date 
of that 
other 
policy 
and the 
inception 
date of 
coverage 
for the 
Agent 
under the 
Automob
ile 
Insurance 
Company 
Policy. 
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If a lapse in 
coverage 
exists, the 
Retroactive 
Date shall 
be: 
 
a. The 
inception 
date of the 
first Policy 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Company 
issued to the 
Agent; or 
 
b.  The 
inception 
date of 
coverage 
when the 
Agent was 
first added to 
the American 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Company 
Policy, if the 
Agent was 
added after 
the inception 
of the first 
16 
 
American 
Automobile 
Insurance 
Company 
Policy.   
 
2. The 
Retroactive 
Date for the 
Sponsoring 
Company 
shall be the 
same as is 
applicable to 
the Agent 
whose 
Wrongful 
Act gave 
rise to the 
Claim 
against the 
Sponsoring 
Company, 
and the 
Retroactive 
Date for the 
Agency/Age
ncy Staff 
shall be the 
same as is 
applicable to 
the Agent 
who is 
17 
 
responsible 
for such 
Agency/Age
ncy Staff. 
 
App. 90.  Prior to his relationship with AAIC, Murray was 
covered under a liability policy from United States Liability 
Insurance Company (“USLIC”) from the period of November 
24, 2004 through November 24, 2005.  That policy had a 
retroactive date of November 24, 2004.  Hence, Murray had a 
lapse in professional liability coverage from November 25, 
2005 through December 31, 2005, immediately proceeding 
the January 1, 2006 effective date of the first AAIC policy.   
 
Murray tendered his defense of the Ennie lawsuit to 
AAIC, and AAIC provided Murray with a defense under a 
reservation of rights to deny coverage and to seek recompense 
of all costs expended if it was determined that the AAIC 
policy did not provide Murray coverage.  On May 8, 2008, 
AAIC filed the present declaratory judgment action against 
Murray, Ennie, and Easter in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and subsequently 
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Murray‟s 
actions that were the basis for the Ennie lawsuit were not 
covered under the AAIC policy.  Ennie and Easter cross-
moved for summary judgment.  The main issues in dispute 
were the determination of the policy‟s retroactive date, the 
date upon which the wrongful acts occurred, and whether the 
wrongful acts took place wholly after the retroactive date.  
Easter and Ennie argued that AAIC must provide coverage 
because the retroactive date for the policy was November 24, 
2004, and Murray‟s wrongful act of failing to insure Ennie for 
liquor liability insurance on March 21, 2006, occurred after 
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the retroactive date.  AAIC, on the other hand, maintained 
that Ennie was not covered under the policy because the 
retroactive date of the policy was January 1, 2006, and 
Murray‟s wrongful act of failing to provide liquor liability 
insurance occurred in 2002 and continued at each policy 
renewal.   
 
On December 15, 2008, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to AAIC, finding that Murray‟s wrongful 
act did not occur wholly after the AAIC policy‟s January 1, 
2006 retroactive date and, therefore, Murray was not covered 
under the policy.  In January 2009, Ennie and Easter
2
 filed 
timely notices of appeal from the District Court‟s judgment.3 
 
II. 
 
 We raised the issue of standing sua sponte and as a 
threshold matter must determine whether Easter and Ennie 
are permitted to challenge the District Court‟s order.  Article 
III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to adjudication 
of actual “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1.  “Courts enforce the case-or-controversy 
requirement through the several justiciability doctrines[,] . . . 
[p]erhaps the most important of [which] is standing.”  Toll 
Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 
                                              
2
 Murray failed to file a timely notice of appeal of the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment and therefore has waived 
his right to appeal.   
 
3
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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2009) (quotation marks omitted).  Standing circumscribes the 
federal judicial power by requiring a litigant to show that it is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of its case.  Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).  The three 
constitutional elements of standing are:  (1) an “injury in 
fact,” that is, a concrete and particularized invasion of a 
legally protected interest that is actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) causation, the showing of a 
fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact 
and the alleged conduct of the defendant; and (3) 
redressability, that is, “it must be „likely,‟ as opposed to 
merely „speculative,‟ that the injury will be „redressed by a 
favorable decision.‟”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
 
 The controlling case in this Court on whether injured 
parties have standing in a declaratory judgment action in the 
insurance coverage context is Federal Kemper Insurance Co. 
v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1986).
4
  In that case, the 
                                              
4
 We afforded the parties the opportunity to address the 
standing issue, and in our correspondence to the parties we 
cited both Rauscher and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Treesdale, 419 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2005), as potentially 
controlling authority.  The parties inevitably agreed that 
Rauscher (and not Treesdale) controls.  Our Treesdale 
opinion is inapplicable because, unlike Rauscher and the case 
at hand, it dealt solely with the standard for intervention 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, and altogether failed to discuss or 
address the principle of standing.  Further, we note that 
neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has determined 
whether a potential intervenor must even have Article III 
standing.  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) 
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insured driver, Rauscher, and his two passengers were 
involved in an automobile accident, leaving one passenger 
permanently disabled.  Id. at 347.  The insurance company, 
Kemper, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against 
Rauscher and his passengers, asking the District Court to 
construe Rauscher‟s insurance policy as not covering the 
accident.  Id. at 348.  Rauscher failed to answer, and the 
                                                                                                     
(“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to 
intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the 
requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of 
Art. III.”).  Those Courts of Appeals that have addressed this 
issue have been split.  Compare Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 
830 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that Article III standing is not a 
prerequisite to intervention), Associated Builders & 
Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (same), 
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(same), Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1989) (same), and United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 
F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), with Mausolf v. Babbitt, 
85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Article III 
standing is necessary for intervention), and United States v. 
36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(concluding that intervention under Rule 24 requires interest 
greater than that of standing).  Because it did not explicitly 
mention standing – or even Rauscher – we will not assume 
that the Court in Treesdale contemplated standing in relation 
to its analysis of intervention and we need not today resolve 
the issue of whether a party seeking to intervene must have 
Article III standing.  Because Treesdale is not on point and 
Rauscher directly addresses standing in a similar factual 
setting, Rauscher will guide our analysis. 
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District Court granted a default judgment to Kemper against 
Rauscher and the passengers, holding that the passengers‟ 
rights were merely derivative of Rauscher‟s rights.  Id.  We 
reversed, holding that a “case or controversy” existed 
between the insurance company and the injured passengers 
and, therefore, the passengers had standing to defend the 
declaratory judgment despite Rauscher‟s absence.  Id. at 353-
54. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the critical 
determination for standing to sue in this scenario was 
“whether the rights of an injured party within the procedural 
context of a declaratory judgment action are truly derivative 
of the rights of the co-defendant insured.”  Id. at 351.  If the 
rights of the injured party are derivative and not independent, 
then there would be no “case or controversy,” as there would 
be no “real dispute” between the injured party and the 
insurance company.  Id.  We recognized that a “case or 
controversy” must exist between the insurance company and 
the injured third party under such circumstances, since the 
insurance company brought the declaratory judgment action 
against the injured third party in the hope of attaining a 
binding judgment against both the insured and the injured 
party.  Id. at 354.  Taking a “realistic” approach, we 
concluded that the injured party has an independent right to 
present its case upon the ultimate issues, apart from that of 
the insured, because “„in many of the liability insurance 
cases, the most real dispute is between the injured third party 
and the insurance company, not between the injured and 
oftentimes impecunious insured.‟”  Id. (quoting 6A James 
Wm. Moore et al., Moore‟s Federal Practice ¶ 57.19). 
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 Applying the principles set forth in Rauscher, we 
conclude that Ennie has standing to appeal the District 
Court‟s order in this declaratory judgment action.  Like the 
passengers in Rauscher, Ennie is the directly injured party 
and its interests in the lawsuit are, therefore, independent of 
the insured (Murray).  Ennie has a particularized interest in 
the lawsuit because a determination of Murray‟s coverage 
would dictate its ability to receive the full benefit of the Ennie 
lawsuit.   
 
The holding in Rauscher, however, does not extend to 
Easter, as he is an injured party twice-removed.  Unlike 
Ennie, Easter‟s interests in this lawsuit are purely derivative 
of the injured third party‟s interests.  Essentially, the only 
interest Easter has in the lawsuit is the potential pecuniary 
gain that will flow to him through Ennie, since he has failed 
to make any claims directly against the insured.  For Easter to 
recover any of the insurance proceeds, he would have to 
prevail in his lawsuit against Ennie, which would have to 
prevail in its lawsuit against Murray, who would have to 
prevail on this appeal of the District Court‟s judgment in 
favor of AAIC.  Counsel for Easter conceded at oral argument 
that standing here would be based on a “two-step process,” 
and it is this “two-step process” that makes Easter‟s interest 
merely speculative.  Notably, Easter has failed to identify a 
court that has permitted standing for a party with derivative 
claims of the injured third party in a declaratory judgment 
action between an insured and insurer.  We conclude that 
Easter does not have standing to pursue this appeal, as his 
interests in this declaratory judgment action are too remote 
and speculative, absent any contractual assignment of rights 
23 
 
under the insurance policy.
5
  Therefore, only Ennie has 
standing to pursue this appeal.   
                                              
5
 Easter also argues that his inclusion by AAIC in the lawsuit 
is determinative of his standing to appeal.  We disagree.  In 
Rauscher, we reasoned that the fact that Kemper brought a 
declaratory judgment action against the injured parties “in 
hopes of attaining a binding judgment against both its insured 
and the injured parties” was persuasive evidence that an 
“actual controversy” existed between them, and, therefore, 
that the injured parties had standing to defend the action.  807 
F.2d at 353-54; see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 
951 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an insurer 
who brought a declaratory judgment action and “out of an 
abundance of caution” named the injured party as an 
additional defendant (1) must have thought the injured party 
had “some potential interest in the insurance policy” and (2) 
had “tacitly conceded [the injured party‟s] standing to appeal 
by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of 
standing”); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 
1123 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the injured party had 
standing to appeal the declaratory judgment in favor of the 
insurance company and noting that it was “decisive” to the 
holding that Dairyland named the injured appellants in its 
declaratory judgment action); Auto. Underwriters Corp. v. 
Graves, 489 F.2d 625, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that 
“[a]n injured person having a possible claim against an 
insurer who has been made a party defendant to an action for 
declaratory judgment possesses the requisite interest to be 
heard on appeal”).    
 
Here, AAIC named Easter and Ennie in its declaratory 
judgment action and failed to contest the standing of either to 
24 
 
III. 
                                                                                                     
appeal.  See AAIC Br. 14 (noting merely that neither Easter 
nor Ennie “has a claim against AAIC” and proceeding to 
address the merits).  On the surface, this weighs in favor of 
the argument that Easter has standing.  However, Easter‟s 
interests in any possible insurance proceeds are much more 
speculative than the injured parties in the cases cited above.  
While AAIC named Easter in its declaratory judgment action, 
we do not believe that is enough to overcome what is 
otherwise a highly speculative, “mere economic” interest in 
insurance proceeds, conditioned upon success in two pending 
lawsuits (unlike the interests of the injured parties in both 
Rauscher and Dairyland whose interests were contingent only 
on success in one lawsuit).   
 
Moreover, we recognize that parties are not permitted 
to waive constitutional standing.  United States v. Hays, 515 
U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (“The question of standing is not subject 
to waiver . . . .”); Nat‟l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 
510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994) (“Standing represents a 
jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all 
stages of the litigation.”); Pressman-Gutman Co. v. First 
Union Nat‟l Bank, 459 F.3d 383, 402 n.20 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that Article III standing, “of course, is not subject to 
waiver”).  Hence, a plaintiff‟s tacit concession of a 
defendant‟s standing by inclusion in the lawsuit cannot be 
dispositive.  Each party must show that it has satisfied the 
elements of standing and, specifically in this case, must have 
demonstrated that it has a concrete and imminent interest in 
the policy at issue to appeal.  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 
U.S. 54, 63 (1986) (“[S]tatus as a „party‟ does not equate with 
status as an appellant.”). 
25 
 
 
We will now address the interpretation of the policy 
between AAIC and Murray to determine if AAIC is required 
to provide Murray with insurance coverage for the Ennie 
lawsuit.  Our review of the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary, and we apply the same legal standard as 
it should have.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In conducting our 
analysis, we must view the record in the light most favorable 
to Ennie, and must draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.  
See Vitalo, 399 F.3d at 542.  To defeat summary judgment, 
however, Ennie must “show[] that the materials cited do not 
establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c)(1). 
 
It is the function of the court to interpret insurance 
contracts under Pennsylvania law.  Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 432 F. Supp. 2d 488, 495 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006) (citing 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Investors Ins. Grp., 
879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 2005)).
6
  The court‟s primary 
consideration in performing this function is “„to ascertain the 
intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the 
written instrument.‟”  Home Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of 
Jonathan DeYoung, 32 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(quoting Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. 
Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983)).  The policy must be read 
                                              
6
 The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies to this 
appeal, as do we.   
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as a whole and construed in accordance with the plain 
meaning of terms.  C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. Am. Home 
Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 1981).  Words of 
common usage must be “construed in their natural, plain, and 
ordinary sense, with a court free to consult a dictionary to 
inform its understanding of terms.”  Melrose Hotel Co., 423 
F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville 
Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 108 (Pa. 1999)).    
 
Where the language of an insurance policy is clear and 
unambiguous, a court must enforce that language.  Med. 
Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999).  
“Furthermore, if possible, „a court should interpret the policy 
so as to avoid ambiguities and give effect to all of its 
provisions.‟”  Id. (quoting Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 
F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1987)).  However, if the contract‟s 
terms are reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, then they must be regarded as ambiguous.  Id.; 
C.H. Heist Caribe Corp., 640 F.2d at 481.  “„Ambiguous 
provisions in an insurance policy must be construed against 
the insurer and in favor of the insured; any reasonable 
interpretation offered by the insured, therefore, must 
control.‟”  Med. Protective Co., 198 F.3d at 104 (quoting 
McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 922 F.2d 1073, 
1075 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Pennsylvania courts have applied this 
rule liberally.  Id.  
 
A. 
 
 In determining AAIC‟s responsibility to provide 
insurance coverage to Murray, we must first address the 
retroactive date of the AAIC policy and then decide whether 
Murray‟s “wrongful act” occurred “wholly after” that 
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retroactive date.  An interpretation of the amendatory 
endorsement, specifically the term “immediately preceded,” 
will determine the retroactive date.  Ennie argues that the 
retroactive date must be determined by considering only 
paragraph 1.a of the amendatory endorsement, and, as such, 
the retroactive date must be the retroactive date “which 
immediately preceded the first policy American Automobile 
Insurance Company issued to the Agent.” App. 90.  Ennie 
contends that the policy which “immediately preceded” the 
first AAIC policy beginning January 1, 2006 was the policy 
issued by USLIC covering the period of November 24, 2004 
through November 24, 2005 because that policy was the last 
in time.  Hence, Ennie maintains that the retroactive date of 
that policy, November 24, 2004, also governs the AAIC 
policy.  In the alternative, Ennie contends that if 
“immediately preceded” is open to two different 
interpretations, then we must construe the term against the 
insurer and conclude that “immediately preceded” means 
“next in line.”   
 
 Ennie also dismisses paragraph 1.b of the amendatory 
endorsement, maintaining that its language and lapse 
provisions are not applicable to Murray.  Paragraph 1.b 
applies only “if the agent was added after the inception date 
of the first American Automobile Insurance Company 
policy.”  App. 90.  Ennie argues that Murray was an insured 
under the first AAIC policy from its inception.  Importantly, 
Ennie notes that paragraph 1.b is the only section referencing 
lapses in coverage, and it therefore contends that such lapses 
are only relevant where there has been a lapse between two 
AAIC polices.  Ennie thus argues that paragraph 1.b is 
inapplicable because Murray was insured under the first 
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AAIC policy since inception, and there were no lapses in 
AAIC coverage because the two policies were continuous. 
 
 AAIC argues that paragraph 1.a of the amendatory 
endorsement supports a retroactive date of January 1, 2006.  
Under paragraph 1.a, AAIC proposes that the definition of 
“immediately” is “without interval of time, without delay, 
straightaway, or without any delay or lapse of time.”  AAIC 
Br. 19-20 (quoting Black‟s Law Dictionary 750 (6th ed. 
1990)).  As such, AAIC contends that there was no policy that 
“immediately preceded” the first AAIC policy since there was 
a delay and lapse of time between Murray‟s coverage with 
USLIC and AAIC.  According to paragraph 1.a, therefore, 
Murray‟s retroactive date would be the first effective date of 
coverage for his AAIC policy, January 1, 2006.  AAIC 
contends that this is the only logical interpretation that could 
have been contemplated by the parties, as the alternative 
would provide Murray coverage despite large gaps in time.  
For example, taking Ennie‟s argument to its extreme, AAIC 
notes that: 
 
if Murray were uninsured for a 
long period of time and, for 
instance, his most recent previous 
policy was in effect from 
November 24, 1975 to November 
24, 1976, and he had a thirty year 
gap in coverage . . . he would 
have a November 1975 retroactive 
date under the AAIC policy.   
 
AAIC Br. 20. 
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 The District Court, in determining the retroactive date, 
aptly pointed out that AAIC‟s policy was poorly drafted, 
specifically citing two drafting errors in the amendatory 
endorsement.  Importantly, the District Court correctly 
assumed that the introductory language of the amendatory 
endorsement – “The Retroactive Date means the earlier of;” – 
mistakenly utilized a semicolon instead of a colon.  App. 20.  
After assuming a colon was intended in order to allow the 
amendatory endorsement to make sense, the District Court 
noted that examining the language of paragraph 1.a in 
isolation would reasonably support Ennie‟s policy 
interpretation of the term “immediately” meaning “next in 
line.”  Id.  However, because Pennsylvania law dictates that 
the endorsement be read as a whole, the District Court 
concluded that the indentation of the lapse language in 
paragraph 1.b was also erroneous because restricting the lapse 
provision to paragraph 1.b would mean it “would never apply 
because the analysis would end after paragraph 1.a, which 
under [Ennie‟s] interpretation . . . ignores any gap in coverage 
without regard to the extent of its duration.”  App. 21.  The 
District Court noted that not applying the lapse language to 
paragraph 1.a renders it superfluous and creates absurd 
results, and then determined that the only reasonable 
interpretation of the endorsement as a whole “is to give effect 
to the lapse provision in all instances of lapse in coverage.”  
Id.  This interpretation dictates, in light of Murray‟s lapse in 
coverage, a retroactive date of January 1, 2006, the inception 
date of the AAIC policy. 
 
  We agree with the thorough and thoughtful analysis by 
the District Court regarding the retroactive date.  
Pennsylvania law dictates that we read the policy language 
regarding the retroactive date as a whole in the context of the 
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entire amendment and we must attempt to give effect to all of 
its provisions.  In doing this, it is clear that the lapse 
provisions must be applicable to both paragraphs of the 
endorsement in order to give logical meaning to paragraph 1.a 
and the lapse provisions themselves.  This interpretation also 
protects the purpose of claims made policies and retroactive 
dates, which are meant to limit an insurer‟s coverage, and 
avoids the absurd result of giving effect to dates decades in 
the past.   
 
Applying the lapse provision to paragraph 1.a, we are 
not persuaded that the term “immediately preceded” is an 
ambiguous term.  While it is true that this Court is bound to 
construe any ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of the 
insured, reading “immediately preceded” in light of the lapse 
provision removes any ambiguity about the term, as the date 
of retroactivity in the policy that “immediately preceded” the 
AAIC policy is only relevant if the insured has maintained 
continuous insurance coverage.  Since Murray allowed his 
coverage to lapse, the retroactive date is the inception date of 
the first AAIC policy issued – January 1, 2006.7  We 
                                              
7
 We note that AAIC also maintains that paragraph 1.a is 
inapplicable to Murray and, therefore, that paragraph 1.b 
governs this situation.  Paragraph 1.a provides that the 
retroactive date is the date shown on the Agent‟s policy 
“[w]hich immediately preceded the first policy [AAIC] issued 
to Agent . . . .”  App. 90 (emphasis added).  As AAIC points 
out, it never issued a policy to Murray.  Rather, it issued the 
relevant policy to the The Agents of Infinity Property 
Casualty Corp.  Murray was first added to the AAIC policy 
on January 1, 2006, when he signed a contract with The 
Agents of Infinity, as contemplated by paragraph 1.b.  See 
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therefore agree with the District Court‟s interpretation of the 
retroactive date and conclude that the policy language is not 
ambiguous. 
 
B. 
 
For coverage under the AAIC policy, both the claim 
and wrongful act by Murray must have occurred “wholly 
after” the retroactive date of January 1, 2006.  Since it is not 
disputed that the claim occurred after the retroactive date, the 
determination of coverage will depend solely on the 
characterization and timing of the wrongful act.  The policy 
defines “wrongful act” as “[a]ny actual or alleged negligent 
act, error or omission, or negligent misstatement or 
misleading statement . . . .”  App. 69.  Ennie maintains that 
Murray‟s only wrongful act was failing to advise and provide 
liquor liability insurance to Ennie on the specific date of the 
                                                                                                     
App. 90 (providing that the retroactive date is the date shown 
on the Agent‟s policy “[w]hich immediately preceded the 
date the Agent was first added to the [AAIC] Policy, if the 
Agent was added after the inception date of the first [AAIC] 
Policy, provided that there is no lapse in coverage . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, AAIC argues, we need not reconcile 
paragraphs 1.a and 1.b, as paragraph 1.a is inapplicable and 
paragraph 1.b clearly indicates a retroactive date of January 1, 
2006.   
 
We need not address this argument, however, because 
as we explain above, we are persuaded that paragraph 1.a 
supports a determination that the retroactive date is January 1, 
2006. 
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accident, March 21, 2006.  Ennie argues that any negligence 
attributable to Murray before that time did not result in any 
harm and, therefore, did not give rise to any claims for which 
coverage is sought under the AAIC policy.  Ennie relies on 
case law regarding negligence causes of action and 
occurrence insurance policies, which requires, as in all 
negligence claims, proof of damages.
8
  In the alternative, 
Ennie also argues that Murray met with a representative of 
Ennie to discuss its insurance coverage after January 1, 2006.  
Ennie contends that Murray‟s wrongful act occurred during 
this meeting where Murray failed to advise him of his need 
for liquor liability coverage.   
 
AAIC maintains that Murray‟s wrongful act occurred 
in the fall of 2002 when he failed to provide liquor liability 
coverage and continued at each policy renewal through the 
last renewal in December 2005.  AAIC concedes that Murray 
met with Ennie regarding its policy in 2006, but argues that 
this meeting was the continuation of Murray‟s wrongful act 
that had already occurred.   
 
Like the District Court, we are not persuaded by 
Ennie‟s argument that the wrongful act occurred on the 
                                              
8
 A claims made policy protects the policy holder against 
claims made during the life of a policy.  In comparison, an 
occurrence policy protects a policy holder against occurrences 
that happen during the policy period and for which claims 
may arise later.  See Twp. of Ctr. v. First Mercury Syndicate, 
117 F.3d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1997).  Here, Ennie urges the 
Court to equate the definition of an “occurrence” under 
occurrence polices to that of a “wrongful act” or “negligent 
act” under AAIC‟s policy.     
33 
 
specific date of the accident.  Ennie‟s reliance on case law 
regarding insurance coverage disputes that result in lawsuits 
of negligence is misplaced.  Here, we are not reviewing a 
cause of action for negligence, but are tasked with 
interpreting the policy‟s language.  The policy defines 
“wrongful act” as “[a]ny actual or alleged negligent act, error 
or omission, or negligent misstatement or misleading 
statement.”  App. 69.  As “negligent act” is not defined in the 
policy, we are instructed to give the term its natural meaning:  
“an act that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another.”  
Black‟s Law Dictionary 26 (8th ed. 2004).  Hence, the plain 
meaning of “negligent act” does not necessitate proof of 
damages, but only a showing that Murray has acted so as to 
expose Ennie to an unreasonable risk of harm.   
 
Ennie‟s reliance on case law regarding occurrence 
insurance policies is similarly misplaced.  There is no need to 
borrow from the definition of “occurrence” under occurrence 
policies when the plain meaning of the term “negligent act” 
adequately defines “wrongful act.”  Moreover, as the District 
Court noted, the definition for an “occurrence” suggests that 
the negligent act and resulting damage could occur at 
different times and that a negligent act is not dependent on 
when the injury occurs.  See D‟Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 
A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that an 
“occurrence” “happens when the injurious effects of the 
negligent act first manifest themselves in a way that would 
put a reasonable person on notice of injury”).  Therefore, we 
reject Ennie‟s interpretation of the term “wrongful act.” 
 
We conclude that the “wrongful act” occurred when 
Murray failed to exercise the proper degree of care in placing 
insurance for Ennie and exposed it to an unreasonable risk of 
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harm.  The record indicates that Ennie, through Poeng, first 
contacted Murray for insurance in 2000, and that Murray 
began placing coverage for Ennie in the fall of 2002.  By 
2005, Ennie was operating as a beer distributor when Murray 
renewed his policy that was in effect on the date of the 
accident, March 24, 2006.  From 2002 until the date of the 
accident, Murray never alleged that he attempted or 
recommended to place liquor liability coverage for Ennie.  
Considering these facts, Murray created an “unreasonable risk 
of harm” to Ennie at the earliest in the fall of 2002 and at the 
latest during the last policy renewal in December 2005.  Any 
meeting between Poeng and Murray that occurred in 2006 
regarding insurance coverage was a continuation of Murray‟s 
wrongful act of failing to provide the proper coverage.  As 
such, Murray‟s wrongful acts did not occur “wholly after” the 
retroactive date of January 1, 2006.  Therefore, we hold that 
Murray is not covered under the AAIC policy, and that the 
District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to 
AAIC.   
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
 
